Naiara Posenato* and Alessandro La Rocca**

1. Historical Background

One of the most emblematic episodes in the history of China’s relations with foreign powers is the imposition of so-called extraterritoriality clauses, introduced through the series of “Unequal Treaties” beginning in the 19th century. These provisions stipulated that foreign nationals in China would be subject to the jurisdiction of their consular authorities and to foreign law, rather than Chinese ones, effectively stripping China of a significant portion of its judicial sovereignty. The Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, followed by a series of agreements imposed by Western powers and Japan, marked the transition of China from a traditional “superior country” (上国) to an ordinary nation-state within the Westphalian international system—a concept foreign to the Chinese political tradition at the time.

These extraterritorial clauses were perceived not only as legal instruments, but as deep identity wounds. They became symbols of national humiliation and played a crucial role in fueling the rise of Chinese nationalism in the decades that followed. The forced subordination to Western international law and the loss of control over its legal territory were absorbed into the collective memory of China, shaping what is now known as the “century of humiliation”—a key component of the modern Chinese political narrative.

In a striking historical reversal, the 21st century sees China itself making strategic use of extraterritorial legal tools to project its influence beyond its borders. A notable example is Article 38 of the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law, which asserts Chinese jurisdiction over anyone, anywhere in the world, for acts deemed threatening to Hong Kong’s security[1]. This provision has already led to arrest warrants issued against U.S. citizens residing in the United States.

China’s global influence now extends beyond economic and diplomatic power, incorporating extraterritorial clauses into its domestic legislation—especially in areas considered strategically sensitive. These clauses allow Chinese law to apply to foreign individuals, companies, or activities occurring outside of China, whenever the Chinese state deems its core interests to be at stake. This raises significant questions about sovereignty and jurisdiction, with potential consequences for foreign governments, corporations, and citizens.

China has embedded such provisions in several key laws. The 2021 Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) applies extraterritorially to foreign entities processing data related to Chinese individuals, if such processing targets the Chinese market or involves monitoring user behavior within China[2]. Similarly, the 2017 Cybersecurity Law—particularly under proposed amendments—extends jurisdiction to any violations deemed to affect China, regardless of where they occur[3].

In the field of trade and security, the 2017 Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL) applies to foreign conduct that disrupts the Chinese market or harms Chinese companies and consumers[4]. The 2023 revised Counter-Espionage Law grants Chinese authorities powers over foreign individuals and organizations deemed to endanger national security[5]. Finally, the 2024 Export Control Regulations extend Chinese authority over foreign activities involving specific Chinese-origin goods or technologies—even if these are processed or manufactured abroad[6].

Likewise, this extraterritorial approach is far from symbolic. It introduces legal frictions and practical challenges. Demonstrating causality—i.e., that foreign behavior directly impacts the Chinese market—can be complex. Jurisdictional conflicts also arise when multiple states claim authority over the same conduct. Enforcing sanctions or legal consequences outside China remains equally difficult.

Taken together, China’s extraterritoriality strategy marks an emerging trend with global legal and political ramifications. It reflects Beijing’s intention to safeguard its strategic interests and expand its normative reach. In the long run, this could lead to increased international tensions and a fragmentation of the global legal order. Other countries and international bodies may respond with countermeasures or push for new rules to regulate or limit the reach of extraterritorial provisions. Ongoing monitoring and thoughtful policy responses will be essential.

2. China–Latin America Cooperation and Judicial Diplomacy

China’s trade relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean has grown significantly in the 21st century. Since 2019, China has been the region’s second-largest trading partner. After, China has become a major recipient and source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) globally. The dynamics of Chinese FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean have been reviewed by several organizations, with notable insights provided by CEPAL-ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean)[7].

Very important, the institutional framework supporting cooperation between Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and China has significantly evolved in the last years. The relationship has become increasingly multidimensional, encompassing various global, multilateral, regional, and bilateral initiatives[8]. LAC and China actively participate in numerous global and multilateral institutions. Key areas of cooperation include projects aligned with the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. China’s Global Development Initiative (2021), Global Security Initiative (2022), and Global Civilization Initiative (2023) are central to this cooperation. The Belt and Road Initiative – BRI, launched in 2013, provides a foundational framework for enhancing development quality and institutions through a shared future for humanity.

Regional cooperation between Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and China is guided by white papers published by China in 2008 and 2016, and the “1+3+6” scheme, which prioritizes: trade, investment and financial cooperation, along with: energy, natural resources, infrastructure, agriculture, industry, technological innovation and information technology. The China-CELAC Forum, established in 2015, serves as the primary regional dialogue mechanism. Ministerial meetings in 2015, 2018, and 2021 have produced joint declarations and cooperation plans, as we’ll see later. The Forum’s institutional arrangements have remained consistent since its inception.

China-Latin American and Caribbean Countries Cooperation Plan (2015-2019), established 14 priorities, including politics and security; trade, investment, and finance; infrastructure and transport; energy and natural resources; agriculture; industry, science and technology, and aviation and aerospace; education and human resources training; culture and sports; tourism; and environmental protection, risk management, disaster reduction, poverty eradication, and health. CELAC and China Joint Plan of Action for Cooperation on Priority Areas (2019-2021) then covered nine general priorities, reiterating commitments in infrastructure, transport, commerce, investment, finance, agriculture, science and technology, and the environment. Subsequently, China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022-2024) prioritizes political and security cooperation; trade and investment; finance; agriculture and food; science and technology; aviation and aerospace; energy; and the environment.

Engagement extends beyond governmental frameworks. For example, the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Business Summit, held annually since 2007, involves thousands of businesspeople and officials. Think tanks also play a significant role, with forums organized by institutions like the China Institute of International Studies and ECLAC. Bilateral initiatives are numerous, with 22 LAC countries signing memoranda of understanding under the Belt and Road Initiative – BRI as of 2024. There are 180 twinning arrangements between cities in China and 17 countries of the region.
In recent years, China has so significantly strengthened its presence in Latin America—not only through trade and diplomacy, but also by shaping legal and institutional frameworks across the region. This expansion has taken place in tandem with a growing strategy of “judicial diplomacy,” which now extends beyond economic engagement into direct legal and judicial cooperation.

In line with this growing legal engagement, the China–CELAC Legal Forum was held in 2024 in Shanghai, bringing together representatives from 18 countries across both regions. The event emphasized the importance of legal cooperation as a pillar of the China–CELAC partnership, with discussions focused on areas such as digital economy, innovation, finance, trade, investment, and climate governance. Chinese officials framed the forum as part of a broader effort to promote mutual development, while Latin American representatives underlined the role of legal collaboration in strengthening governance, attracting investment, and fostering sustainable growth.

A key moment in this development was the IV Ministerial Meeting of the China–CELAC Forum, held in Beijing on May 13, 2025. The meeting, which coincided with the tenth anniversary of the Forum’s creation, resulted in the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and the Joint Action Plan 2025–2027. Paragraph 24 of the above-mentioned declaration is worth mentioning, as it states that in order to promote justice, support economic growth and protect the rule of law, it is essential to tackle various forms of transnational crime with determination. These include drug trafficking and trafficking in chemical precursors, human trafficking, migrant smuggling, corruption, illegal arms trafficking and unauthorized mining. These phenomena represent a real threat to social and institutional stability. In this context, the signatory countries recognize integrity as a shared value and are committed to strengthening international cooperation through joint initiatives, the exchange of best practices and enhanced collaboration between judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies, in accordance with existing international legal instruments.

At the same time, with the China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2025-2027), certain important articles become relevant, such as Article 3, VI (intellectual property)[9] and Article 4, II (anti-corruption cooperation)[10] and III (police and law enforcement cooperation)[11].

Cooperation between high courts in both regions is also intensifying. In just the first months of the current year, a delegation led by He Xiaorong, Vice President of the Supreme People’s Court of China, participated in a major institutional mission to Latin America, which included visits to Chile and Brazil. Brazil, in particular, benefits from an additional channel of engagement with the Chinese legal system through the BRICS Court Presidents Forum[12].

Within this last context, a particularly relevant topic is the promotion of AI-based legal technologies, especially in the fields of digital justice and smart courts. These systems—pioneered by the Supreme People’s Court since 2017—leverage big data, machine learning, and digital platforms to automate various aspects of civil and administrative dispute resolution. In practice, they can assign cases to judges, recommend sentencing models based on legal precedents, and even generate preliminary drafts of rulings[13].

Previous editions of the China–CELAC Legal Forum (held in 2018, 2021, and 2023) brought together judicial representatives from Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina for training[14] and technical exchange with Chinese experts in legal AI and digital justice. Official communications from China’s Ministry of Justice emphasize a shared goal of “building a fairer international legal order”, yet some analysts argue that this is part of a broader normative soft power strategy. Latin American legal systems are being encouraged to adopt decision-making logic and tools modeled on the Chinese judicial system.

While these technologies are presented as neutral tools, some scholars[15] have noted that China’s judicial AI is deeply embedded in values of state efficiency and ideological conformity. These principles may clash with the liberal and rights-based traditions of many Latin American constitutions. Additionally, the use of Chinese-developed software may create technological and regulatory dependencies. Reports from research institutions such as the Dialogue Americas Center[16] have pointed out that cooperation agreements often contain exclusivity clauses, interoperability restrictions, and mandatory use of predefined regulatory protocols—posing a challenge to the technological and legal sovereignty of partner states.

[1] The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region – “Article 38. This Law shall apply to offences under this Law committed against the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region from outside the Region by a person who is not a permanent resident of the Region.”
[2] Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (Passed at the 30th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress on August 20, 2021) “Article 3: This Law applies to the activities of handling the personal information of natural persons within the borders of the People’s Republic of China. Where one of the following circumstances is present in handling activities outside the borders of the People’s Republic of China of personal information of natural persons within the borders of the People’s Republic of China, this Law applies as well: 1. Where the purpose is to provide products or services to natural persons inside the borders; 2. Where analyzing or assessing activities of natural persons inside the borders; 3. Other circumstances provided in laws or administrative regulations.”
[3] Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China (Passed November 7, 2016. Effective June 1, 2017) “Article 75. Where an overseas institution, organization, or individual engages in attacks, intrusions, interference, damage, or other activities that endanger the critical information infrastructure of the People’s Republic of China, resulting in significant consequences, the institution, organization, or individual shall be investigated for legal liability in accordance with the law; the public security authorities of the State Council and other relevant departments may decide to freeze the assets of such institution, organization, or individual or impose other necessary sanctions.”
[4] See https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-anti-unfair-competition-law-amendments/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[5] Counterespionage Law of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted at the 11th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress on November 1, 2014, and revised at the 2nd Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Fourteenth National People’s Congress on April 26, 2023) “Article 10. Espionage endangering national security of the People’s Republic of China, committed by any overseas institution, organization or individual, or committed by any other person instigated or funded by such overseas institution, organization or individual, or committed by a domestic institution, organization, or individual in collusion with such overseas institution, organization or individual, must be investigated in accordance with the law.”
[6] See https://www.eversheds-sutherland.com/it/italy/insights/effective-1-december-2024-pr-cs-new-regulation-on-the-export-control-of-dual-use-items
[7] For a recent publication see Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2025). Relations between Latin America and the Caribbean and China: areas of opportunity for more productive, inclusive and sustainable development (LC/TS.2025/16). Available at https://repositorio.cepal.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/971f5ec0-1f9f-4211-b82e-65aafbc212e1/content.
[8] Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2025). Relations between Latin America and the Caribbean and China, cit., pp. 47-51.
[9] “Both sides are willing to strengthen practical cooperation in intellectual property departments.”
[10] “Both sides are willing to evaluate cooperation in the fields of anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, combating illegal capital flows and asset recovery in accordance with their respective domestic laws and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Actively study and negotiate the signing of law enforcement and judicial cooperation agreements such as the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters.”
[11] “ 1. On the basis of respecting each other’s domestic laws and practices, expand channels for the police departments of both sides to participate in each other’s training programs and mutual law enforcement assistance. 2. Promote experience exchange and training in combating wildlife smuggling, illegal mining and precious metals trade, human trafficking, smuggled immigrants, illegal arms trade and other areas. 3. Explore cooperation models between China and Latin America in combating the production, consumption and trafficking of controlled drugs and promote bilateral exchanges to effectively implement relevant international conventions.”
[12] See https://english.court.gov.cn/2025-04/23/c_1105975.htm; https://english.court.gov.cn/2024-07/02/c_1001450.htm .
[13] On the subject of technological innovation applied to the judicial field in China, see Li, L.Y., The Faces of Judicial Data Governance, in The Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 51, 2025, pp. 31-46.
[14] See https://english.court.gov.cn/2025-06/05/c_1105981.htm
[15] Cfr. Creemers, R., The Regulation of Generative AI in China, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5228697 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5228697, 2024, pp.1-17.
[16] https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/chinas-expanding-playbook-legal-and-political-influence-in-latin-america/?utm

*Naiara Posenato
Professor at Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy

**Alessandro La Rocca
Bachelor of Political Science Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy